A wide array of species throughout the animal kingdom has shown the ability to distinguish between quantities. Aside from being important for optimal foraging decisions, this ability seems to also be of great relevance in group-living animals as it allows them to inform their decisions regarding engagement in between-group conflicts based on the size of competing groups. However, it is often unclear whether these animals rely on numerical information alone to make these decisions or whether they employ other cues that (...) may covary with the differences in quantity. In this study we used a touch screen paradigm to investigate the quantity discrimination abilities of two closely related group-living species, wolves and dogs, using a simultaneous visual presentation paradigm. Both species were able to successfully distinguish between stimuli of different quantities up to 32 items and ratios up to 0.80, and their results were in accordance with Weber's law (which predicts worse performances at higher ratios). However, our controls showed that both wolves and dogs may have used continuous, non-numerical cues, such as size and shape of the stimuli, in conjunction with the numerical information to solve this task. In line with this possibility, dogs' performance greatly exceeded that which they had shown in other numerical competence paradigms. We discuss the implications these results may have on these species' underlying biases and numerical capabilities, as well as how our paradigm may have affected the animals' ability to solve the task. (shrink)

Phenomenology has been adapted for use in qualitative health research, where it’s often used as a method for conducting interviews and analyzing interview data. But how can phenomenologists study subjects who cannot accurately reflect upon or report their own experiences, for instance, because of a psychiatric or neurological disorder? For conditions like these, qualitative researchers may gain more insight by conducting observational studies in lieu of, or in conjunction with, interviews. In this article, we introduce a phenomenological approach to conducting (...) this kind of observational research. The approach relies on conceptual grounding to focus a study on specific aspects of the participants’ experiences. Moreover, the approach maintains the openness to novel discoveries that qualitative research requires while also providing a structured framework for data collection and analysis. To illustrate its practical application, we use examples of hemispatial neglect—a neurologic disorder in which patients characteristically lack awareness of their own illness and bodily capacities. However, the approach that we describe can be applied more broadly to the study of complex illness experiences and other experiential alterations. (shrink)

A key challenge when learning language in naturalistic circumstances is to extract linguistic information from a continuous stream of speech. This study investigates the predictors of such implicit learning among adults exposed to a new language in a new modality. Sign-naïve participants were shown a 4-min weather forecast in Swedish Sign Language. Subsequently, we tested their ability to recognise 22 target sign forms that had been viewed in the forecast, amongst 44 distractor signs that had not been viewed. The target (...) items differed in their occurrence frequency in the forecast and in their degree of iconicity. The results revealed that both frequency and iconicity facilitated recognition of target signs cumulatively. The adult mechanism for language learning thus operates similarly on sign and spoken languages as regards frequency, but also exploits modality-salient properties, for example iconicity for sign languages. Individual differences in cognitive skills and language learning background did not predict recognition. The properties of the input thus influenced adults’ language learning abilities at first exposure more than individual differences. (shrink)

Most of us create and use a panoply of non-sentential representations throughout our ordinary lives: we regularly use maps to navigate, charts to keep track of complex patterns of data, and diagrams to visualize logical and causal relations among states of affairs. But philosophers typically pay little attention to such representations, focusing almost exclusively on language instead. In particular, when theorizing about the mind, many philosophers assume that there is a very tight mapping between language and thought. Some analyze utterances (...) as the outer vocalizations of inner thoughts (e.g. Grice 1957, Devitt 2005), while others treat thought as a form of inner speech (e.g. Sellars 1956/1997, Carruthers 2002). But even philosophers who take no stand on the relative priority of language and thought still tend to individuate mental states in terms of the sentences we use to ascribe them. Indeed, Dummett (1993) claims that it is constitutive of analytic philosophy that it approaches the mind by way of language. In many ways, this linguistic model is salutary. Our thoughts are often intimately intertwined with their linguistic expression, and public language does provide a comparatively tractable proxy for, and a window into, the messier realm of thought. However, an exclusive focus on thought as it is expressed in language threatens to leave other sorts of thought unexplained, or even to blind us to their possibility. In particular, many cognitive ethologists and psychologists find it useful to talk about humans, chimpanzees, birds, rats, and even bees as employing cognitive maps. We need to make sense of this way of talking about minds as well as more familiar sentential descriptions. In what follows, I investigate the theoretical and practical possibility of non-sentential thought. Ultimately, I am most interested in the contours of distinctively human thought: what forms does human thought take, and how do those different forms interact? How does human thought compare with that of other animals? In this essay, however, I focus on a narrower and more basic theoretical question: could thought occur in maps? Many philosophers are convinced that in some important sense, thought per se must be language-like.. (shrink)

Does thought precede language, or the other way around? How does having a language affect our thoughts? Who has a language, and who can think? These questions have traditionally been addressed by philosophers, especially by rationalists concerned to identify the essential difference between humans and other animals. More recently, theorists in cognitive science, evolutionary biology, and developmental psychology have been asking these questions in more empirically grounded ways. At its best, this confluence of philosophy and science promises to blend the (...) respective strengths of each discipline, bringing abstract theory to bear on reality in a principled and focused way. At its worst, it risks degenerating into a war of words, with each side employing key expressions in its own idiosyncratic way – or worse, contaminating empirical research with a priori dogmas inherited from outmoded philosophical worldviews. In Baboon Metaphysics (2007), Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth offer an analysis of baboon cognition that promises to exemplify the very best interaction of philosophical theory and empirical research. They argue that baboons have a language of thought: a language-like representational medium, which supports the sophisticated cognitive abilities required to negotiate their complex social environment. This claim is intended to be surprising in its own right, and also to shed light on the evolution of spoken language. Because our own ancestors likely lived in a similarly complex social environment, Cheney and Seyfarth propose that the earliest humans also developed language first as a cognitive medium, and that spoken language evolved as a means to express those thoughts. There are two potential difficulties here. First, ‘Language of Thought’ (LOT) is a term of art, with much associated theoretical baggage and often comparatively little careful exposition. Thus, evaluating the claim requires getting clearer about just what LOT implies in this context.. (shrink)

Recently, philosophers have discovered that they have a lot to learn from, or at least to ponder about, fiction. Many metaphysicians are attracted to fiction as a model for our talk about purported objects and properties, such as numbers, morality, and possible worlds, without embracing a robust Platonist ontology. In addition, a growing group of philosophers of mind are interested in the implications of our engagement with fiction for our understanding of the mind and emotions: If I don’t believe that (...) Anna Karenina exists, can I really pity her, or hope or desire that she extricate herself from her tragic situation? And why is there no “morality fiction,” analogous to science fiction? I suspect that philosophers have been especially comfortable thinking about fiction because it seems, at least prima facie, to employ the imagination in a way that conforms to a standard model of the mind. Specifically, contemporary philosophers tend to think of imagination as a form of mental pretense. Mental pretense can take two main forms: a cognitive attitude of supposing a set of propositions to be true (make-believe) or else an experiential state of imaging a scenario as if it were before one (imaging). Much of our pretense intertwines the cognitive and experiential modalities, of course. But both share a crucial common feature: all of one’s imaginative effort is invested in pretending that certain contents obtain. In this sense, we can understand imagination as the “offline” simulation of actual beliefs and perceptions (and perhaps other attitudes as well), where we analyze these in the normal way, as states individuated by their attitude and representational content. While I share the burgeoning interest in fiction, I want to suggest that we also have a lot to learn from poetry, and in particular from poetic metaphor. I will argue.. (shrink)

We should not admit categorial restrictions on the significance of syntactically well formed strings. Syntactically well formed but semantically absurd strings, such as ‘Life’s but a walking shadow’ and ‘Caesar is a prime number’, can express thoughts; and competent thinkers both are able to grasp these and ought to be able to. Gareth Evans’ generality constraint, though Evans himself restricted it, should be viewed as a fully general constraint on concept possession and propositional thought. For (a) even well formed but (...) semantically cross-categorial strings often do possess substantive inferential roles; (b) hearers exploit these inferential roles in interpreting such strings metaphorically; (c) there is no good reason to deny truth-conditions to strings with inferential roles. (shrink)

With disagreement, doubts, or ambiguous grounds in end–of-life decisions, doctors are advised to involve a clinical ethics committee. However, little has been published on doctors’ experiences with discussing an end-of-life decision in a CEC. As part of the quality assurance of this work, we wanted to find out if clinicians have benefited from discussing end-of-life decisions in CECs and why. We will disseminate some Norwegian doctors’ experiences when discussing end-of-life decisions in CECs, based on semi-structured interviews with fifteen Norwegian physicians (...) who had brought an end-of-life decision case to a CEC. Almost half of the cases involved conflicts with the patients’ relatives. In a majority of the cases, there was uncertainty about what would be the ethically preferable solution. Reasons for referring the case to the CEC were to get broader illumination of the case, to get perspective from people outside the team, to get advice, or to get moral backing on a decision already made. A great majority of the clinicians reported an overall positive experience with the CECs’ discussions. In cases where there was conflict, the clinicians reported less satisfaction with the CECs’ discussions. The study shows that most doctors who have used a CEC in an end-of-life decision find it useful to have ethical and/or legal aspects illuminated, and to have the dilemma scrutinized from a new perspective. A systematic discussion seems to be significant to the clinicians. (shrink)

Background Since the enactment of the euthanasia law in the Netherlands, there has been a lively public debate on assisted dying that may influence the way patients talk about euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide with their physicians and the way physicians experience the practice of EAS. Aim To show what developments physicians see in practice and how they perceive the influence of the public debate on the practice of EAS. Methods We conducted a secondary analysis of in-depth interviews with 28 Dutch (...) physicians who had experience with a complex case of EAS. Respondents were recruited both by the network of physicians working for SCEN as well as via a national questionnaire, wherein participating physicians could indicate their willingness to be interviewed. Results Three themes came up in analysing the interviews. First, the interviewed physicians experienced a change in what patients would expect from them: from a role as an involved caregiver to being the mere performer of EAS. Second, interviewees said that requests for EAS based on non-medical reasons came up more frequently and wondered if EAS was the right solution for these requests. Last, respondents had the impression that the standards of EAS are shifting and that the boundaries of the EAS regulation were stretched. Conclusions The perceived developments could make physicians less willing to consider a request for EAS. Our results also raise questions about the role of physicians and of EAS in society. (shrink)

The movement advocating the formal certification of clinical ethics consultants may result in major changes to the field of clinical ethics consultation by creating a new standard of care. The actual certification process is still in the development phase, but unanswered questions include: What will certification cost, and, Who will pay? Currently there is little salary support for ethics consultants and no regulation requiring healthcare institutions to offer clinical ethics consultation. Without the support of healthcare administrators and accreditation bodies, this (...) may remain unchanged.Healthcare administrators may be unwilling to pay for certification or professional services if accreditation bodies do not require healthcare institutions to provide certified ethics consultants’ services. If consultants will not be reimbursed or paid, they may not seek certification. If certified consultants are required, healthcare administrators may look for ways to cover the costs for providing this service, including insurance or third-party reimbursement and direct billing of patients for consultations, which may affect who performs and who participates in ethics consultation. However, this is less than ideal, as bioethicists believe ethics consultation should be available to all as part of providing safe, quality ethical care and support and guidance for patients, families, and healthcare staff.Going forward, bioethicists should study quality improvement, patient safety, and cost-savings resulting from certification-eligible clinical ethics consultants’ activities. Administrators and financial personnel can be surveyed regarding their support for the certification process. Bioethicists should enlist the help of patient rights and safety advocacy groups, professional medical associations, and healthcare administrators. Bioethicists should invite accreditation bodies, healthcare administrators, and financial personnel to collaborate in the development of the certification process. Without their support, certification may be of value only to the bioethics community, and may have little standing in actual clinical healthcare institution settings. (shrink)

Addiction is a common condition affecting millions of people worldwide of which only a small proportion receives treatment. The development and use of healthcare services is influenced by how addiction is understood (e.g., a condition to treat, a shameful condition to stigmatize), notably with respect to how volition is impacted (e.g., addiction as a choice or a disease beyond one’s control). Through semi-structured qualitative interviews, we explore the implicit views and understandings of addiction and volition across three stakeholder groups: people (...) with lived experience of addiction, clinicians with experience treating addiction, and members of the public without lived experience of addiction. We notably examine whether three paradigms, i.e., three philosophical sets of understandings about the nature of reality and knowledge (realism, relativism, pragmatism) reflect how stakeholders envision addiction and volition in the context of addiction. The use of these paradigms allows for the characterization of different stances on addiction and volition and an assessment of the coherence of beliefs about these matters. Our findings demonstrate that few participants relied on a single epistemic paradigm when describing their views. Furthermore, there were notable differences in understandings of volition between the clinician group, who were more oriented toward pragmatism, and people with lived experience of addiction, who were less oriented toward realism. Despite its limitations, our study suggests that a greater appreciation for the complexity of views held by different stakeholders about addiction and volition could help critically assess the search for coherence expressed in academic and policy debates. (shrink)

Anthropologists have tended to treat dreams as private fantasies arising from restless libidos struggling with reality. In this view, the dreamer is a victim of what she or he does not want, the intentions of the dreamer, and dreamed of, are often confused or illusory, and what happens in the dream is subj ect to a more primary, more objective, waking reality.The Barok people of New Ireland, Papua New Guinea, define dreams as both sleeping and waking experiences. Their dreams are (...) expressions of spiritually powerful persons who deal with a spiritual reality.In waking and real, but substantially dreamlike experiences such as one I describe in this paper, the desires and intents of all involved were perceived as wild possibilities. In the three sleeping dreams that I describe, the desires and intents of the dreamers were true, clearly expressed, and effective in creating or foretelling reality.Describing such subjective and willful experiences entails personal and professional risk. But toward understanding what happened, I undertake this in personally revealing terms, and I recommend Barok and other Native perspectives for the light they shed on dreams and reality.Social science has, for the most part, left dream analysis to the psychologists, and dreaming experiences to "the natives.” People educated in modern European traditions, and especially in academe, learn to not talk plainly or too much about their more subjective experiences or awarenesses, e.g, sex, emotions, and dreams. This applies not only to our lives as fieldworkers, but to our private lives in Western culture.Even recent publications1 still define dreams as a softer and more subjective, or even false, too private, in contrast to the harder and more objective, true reality of waking life (see Tedlock 1987). From this perspective, the accepted truth of there being an objective, socially defined, wakeful reality is not seriously called into question.Fieldwork experiences have shown me different distinctions between dreaming and not‐dreaming realities. I have learned to both expect and get more from dreams. I did not seek nor intentionally precipitate these experiences. They were a congruent part of my learning during four different periods of fieldwork.These experiences suggest a link between the ambiguity of intent in western style, non‐Native2 dreamers, and a lack of creative power. This contrasts with the clarity in the intent of Native style dreamers, and a real creative power.This link short‐circuits conventional academic distinctions between dreaming and waking experiences. For this reason, people like myself have not paid attention to these kinds of field experiences, much less written them up. We fear being disbelieved and discredited. Treating dreams on a comparable footing with objective reality is tantamount to "going native.”3 As Katherine Ewing has stated it, the problem is how to believe the Native meaning of dreams in defiance of the taboo against anthropologists' accepting the "temptation to believe" that "the subjects of one's research actually know something about the human condition and an encompassing 'reality'"(Ewing 1994:572).The field experiences I describe here have made me a believer of both the Native version of what happened, and the truth of there being an encompassing (Native) reality.4 They also convinced me of the necessity of trying to deal openly with what I know of the internal, private, libidinous, and willful stuff that is a part of these dreaming experiences. I reveal my own intent, desires, and needs, in both personal and professional terms, in order to lay some of the cards on the table, in order to look at them from both Native and non‐Native perspectives on what happened.I have learned that the difference between dreams and reality is not what it has been made out to be. On the one hand, the conventional definition of reality too strongly limits my ability to talk about my subjective experiences of it. On the other hand, the conventional definition of dreams does not make enough sense of my real experiences.By describing the real, non‐dreaming experience in which my subjective feelings are centered, the problematic issues of my own wakeful intent as a person and as an anthropologist are centered. This allows comparison of what is supposedly the nature of waking reality with what I experienced in the three sleeping dreams (hereafter "sleepdreams") which follow.The first three sleepdreams were experienced when I was living among Barok people at New Ireland, PNG, between 1979 and 1985. The fourth occured at Taumako, Solomon Islands, in 1993. (shrink)

Meta‐synthesis of qualitative research can be an important way to consolidate and grow nursing knowledge and theory. However, from recent readings of such works in the nursing literature, one can observe that there is increasing use of meta‐synthesis being used as a way to simply aggregate qualitative research findings in a manner claimed to be similar to quantitative meta‐research while also remaining compatible with the qualitative research tradition. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether this meta‐aggregation form of (...) research has a sound epistemological foundation and should be considered a viable form of meta‐synthesis. The conclusion drawn is that meta‐aggregation falls short of being a sound method and is not compatible with the qualitative research philosophy. It is also concluded that meta‐aggregation should not be seen as a form of qualitative meta‐synthesis. Meta‐synthesis is best understood as a way to re‐interpret, compare and translate disparate qualitative studies using different conceptual apparatus into a consolidated knowledge of fundamental importance to nursing care practitioners. To conclude, aggregating qualitative research tends to turn rich descriptions into thin abstractions that are of little use to nursing practice knowledge and does not advance nursing science. (shrink)

This article analyses how the new type of worker is constructed in respect to gender in current management literature. It contributes to the increasing body of work in organisational theory and business ethics which interrogates management texts by analysing textual representations of gender. A discourse analysis of six texts reveals three inter-connected yet distinct ways in which gender is talked about. First, the awareness discourse attempts to be inclusive of gender yet reiterates stereotypes in its portrayal of women. Second, within (...) the individualisation discourse, formerly discriminatory elements of gender lose their importance but a gender dimension reappears within the idea of ‹Brand You’. Third, in the new ideal discourse, women are constructed as ideal workers of the future. The article argues that there is little space within this web of discourses for an awareness of the continued inequalities experienced by women in relation to men to be voiced and that this rhetorical aporia contributes to a ‹post-feminist’ climate. (shrink)

Texts about theory in nursing often refer to theory construction by using inductive methods in a rigid way. In this paper, it is instead argued that theories are created, which is in line with most philosophers of science. Theory creation is regarded as a creative process that does not follow a specific method or logic. As in any creative endeavour, the inspiration for theory creation can come from many sources, including previous research and existing theory. The main idea put forward (...) is that deductive qualitative research approaches should play a key role in theory creation. Furthermore, there is a need to differentiate between theory creation and theory justification. A model that emphasizes the creative aspects of theory creation and theory justification using qualitative approaches is presented. The model suggests that knowledge development is a deductive trial‐and‐error process where theory creation is followed by testing. Scientific theory creation and justification are presented as an iterative process that is deductive in that a testable hypothesis is derived from the theory. If the hypothesis is falsified, then the theory needs modification or might be altogether wrong. Several factors can block the creative process, both in theory development and in finding ways to test a theory in the justification phase. Some of these blockers are the idea of ‘building blocks’ and the inductive view of science often brought forward in nursing. Other blockers include striving for consensus and adherence to existing nursing philosophies and existing theories. Research and knowledge development are creative processes, and following predefined methods is not enough to ensure scientific rigour in qualitative nursing research. (shrink)

The patient’s home is a common setting for palliative care. This means that we need to understand current palliative care philosophy and how its goals can be realized in home‐care nursing encounters (HCNEs) between the nurse, patient and patient’s relatives. The existing research on this topic describes both a negative and a positive perspective. There has, however, been a reliance on interview and descriptive methods in this context. The aim of this study was to explore planned HCNEs in palliative care. (...) The design was a multiple case study based on observations. The analysis includes a descriptive and an explanation building phase. The results show that planned palliative HCNEs can be described as a process of co‐creating possibilities for the patient to reach vital goals through shared knowledge in a warm and caring atmosphere, based on good caring relations. However, in some HCNEs, co‐creation did not occur: Wishes and needs were discouraged or made impossible and vital goals were not reached for the patients or their relatives. Further research is needed to understand why. The co‐creative process presented in this article can be seen as a concretization of the palliative care ideal of working with a person‐centered approach. (shrink)

The widows of the Pastoral Epistles have been a puzzle for interpreters for generations. In the “Widows’ Tale” different categories of women are given a whole set of instructions, including how they shall be organized and with whom to live. In this article, I will highlight the interpretative potential of the very last verse of the paragraph, where “a believing woman who has widows” is mentioned. In some important manuscripts, scribes have added “believing man” in v. 16, while others have (...) left out the woman altogether. What can these disagreements and changes tell? I will argue that not enough scholarly attention has been directed to this verse. There is huge potential for a new understanding of the whole paragraph hidden here. Attention to alternative housing arrangements and manuscript variations will be employed as interpretative tools. I will use the disagreement among scribes to rethink variety and difference, and to reimagine ekklēsia within intersectional early Christian households. (shrink)

We first present a selection of vignette examples from empirical psychological research to illustrate how the phenomenon of metaemotion is studied within different domains of psychology. We then present a theoretical distinction which has been made between three facets of metacognition, namely metacognitive experiences, metacognitive knowledge, and metacognitive strategies. Referring back to the vignette examples from metaemotion research, we argue that a similar distinction can be drawn between three facets of metaemotion, namely metaemotional experiences, metaemotional knowledge, and metaemotional strategies. We (...) argue that this distinction clarifies some of the unresolved issues in metaemotion research, and therefore has important implications for the study of metaemotion, both methodologically and theoretically. (shrink)

De senere år har pleie- og omsorgstjenesten i mange norske kommuner startet med ulike former for etikkarbeid, oftest initiert av KS’ prosjekt “Samarbeid om etisk kompetanseheving”. Hensikten med vår studie var å evaluere innsatsen i de kommunene som deltok i prosjektet fra starten av, med vekt på hvilke tiltak som var iverksatt, hvilke virksomheter dette omfattet, og om tiltakene har fortsatt utover prosjektperioden. Studien har et kvalitativt design. Materialet er hovedsakelig basert på telefonintervjuer med kontaktpersoner for etikksatsingen i 34 kommuner. (...) Det transkriberte materialet er analysert ved kvalitativ innholdsanalyse. Med unntak av fem kommuner som aldri kom i gang med etikkarbeidet, hadde de fleste startet etikkrefleksjon innenfor flere tjenester, oftest i sykehjem og hjemmetjenester. Noen kommuner hadde imidlertid ikke klart å videreføre etikkarbeidet utover en prosjektperiode. Det var stor variasjon både i etikkarbeidets forankring i kommunen, omfang, hyppighet og metoder. Et gjennomgående funn er vektlegging av behovet for etikkkompetanse og oppfølging av dem som skal lede etikkarbeidet. Flertallet av kommunene som fortsatt gjennomfører etikkrefleksjon, tar utgangspunkt i egen praksis, men et mindretall anvender strukturerte metoder. Dersom etikkarbeidet i kommunen skal være levedyktig over tid, bør arbeidet forankres på flere nivåer i organisasjonen, og de som skal lede dette arbeidet, bør få styrket sin kompetanse i etikk og etikkrefleksjon.Nøkkelord: etikk, evaluering, kommunehelsetjenestenEnglish summary: Building ethical competence in Norwegian municipalities: What has been done and what has been sustainable?“Cooperation for building ethics competence” is a national project aimed to stimulate moral reflection and build competence in ethics in community health services in Norway. This article is based on an evaluation of the activities implemented by the first 34 participating municipalities, exploring which measures were implemented, which services and employees were involved, and if the measures are sustainable. The study has a qualitative design, and the data mainly consists of telephone interviews with “key” persons in 34 municipalities. With the exception of five municipalities that never really started ethics work, the majority had implemented ethical reflection in several areas, most often in nursing homes and home care services. There was great variation with regard to the implementation. Many had tried a variety of reflection models, and only a minority of the municipalities were using a structured method of ethical reflection. A consistent finding is the need for more competence; many of those who run ethical reflection are reported to need more competence both in ethics and methods for systematic reflection. There were also great variations in how well the ethics projects were anchored within the municipality. To make ethical interventions sustainable, this study indicates the importance of strong anchoring within the municipality, the need for ethical competence, as well as good methods for structuring ethical reflection. (shrink)

The present contribution focuses on the place of religion in the public domain and revolves around three concepts: vulnerability, recognition and tragedy. Focusing on these three notions, I will endeavour to shed some light on the complex relationship between religion and the public arena. More specifically, I will draw attention to the fact that the struggle for recognition can often lead to tragedy. There is no adequate political solution to this problem. The reason for this is that the nature of (...) the recognition religious people desire differs from that which the political system seems to be able to offer. Nevertheless, and I hope to elaborate this in what follows, an appropriate answer to this problem needs to be found, since the danger exists that the struggle for recognition might derail . It is in this perspective that I turn to religion. Whereas politics manoeuvres within the domain of solvable problems, religion offers people a framework to deal appropriately with problems for which no solution appears to exist, or at least not an immediate one. In situations of inner conflict, religion can open up perspectives of hope for solidarity. (shrink)

Today's climate models are supported in a couple of ways that receive little attention from philosophers or climate scientists. In addition to standard 'model fit', wherein a model's simulation is compared to observational data, there is an additional type of confirmation available through the variety of instances of model fit. When a model performs well at fitting first one variable and then another, the probability of the model under some standard confirmation function, say, likelihood, goes up more than under each (...) individual case of fit alone. Thus, two instances of fit of distinct variables of a global climate model using distinct data sets considered collectively will provide stronger evidence for a model than either one of the instances considered individually. This has consequences for model robustness. Sets of models that produce robust results will, if their assumptions vary enough and they each are observationally sound, provide reasons to endorse common structures found in those models. Finally, independent empirical support for aspects and assumptions of the model provides an additional confirmational virtue for climate models, contrary to what is implied by some current philosophical writing on this topic. (shrink)

Knowledge engineering is the term given to the process of developing expert systems and knowledge engineers are the people who acquire the requisite knowledge from experts and structure that knowledge into a useable computer program. As knowledge engineering becomes a more accepted technology, there is increasing concern about attendant social costs, such as job displacement or possible exploitation of experts. This paper reports on our efforts to explore this latter issue by scrutinizing how knowledge engineers think about the domain expert (...) and the role that person plays in system development. To accomplish this aim, we asked several samples of novice engineers to write story completions to a preamble that describes a knowledge engineer encountering a reluctant expert who may be fearing job loss if the system is implemented. The resulting accounts were content-analysed for insights as to how novice system builders think about experts. The results indicate that experts are conceived more as a tool to be used rather than a person to be respected. (shrink)

The theory of evolution by natural selection is, perhaps, the crowning intellectual achievement of the biological sciences. There is, however, considerable debate about which entity or entities are selected and what it is that fits them for that role. This article aims to clarify what is at issue in these debates by identifying four distinct, though often confused, concerns and then identifying how the debates on what constitute the units of selection depend to a significant degree on which of these (...) four questions a thinker regards as central. (shrink)

In nursing today, it remains unclear what constitutes a good foundation for qualitative scientific inquiry. There is a tendency to define qualitative research as a form of inductive inquiry; deductive practice is seldom discussed, and when it is, this usually occurs in the context of data analysis. We will look at how the terms ‘induction’ and ‘deduction’ are used in qualitative nursing science and by qualitative research theorists, and relate these uses to the traditional definitions of these terms by Popper (...) and other philosophers of science. We will also question the assertion that qualitative research is or should be inductive. The position we defend here is that qualitative research should use deductive methods. We also see a need to understand the difference between the creative process needed to create theory and the justification of a theory. Our position is that misunderstandings regarding the philosophy of science and the role of inductive and deductive logic and science are still harming the development of nursing theory and science. The purpose of this article is to discuss and reflect upon inductive and deductive views of science as well as inductive and deductive analyses in qualitative research. We start by describing inductive and deductive methods and logic from a philosophy of science perspective, and we examine how the concepts of induction and deduction are often described and used in qualitative methods and nursing research. Finally, we attempt to provide a theoretical perspective that reconciles the misunderstandings regarding induction and deduction. Our conclusion is that openness towards deductive thinking and testing hypotheses is needed in qualitative nursing research. We must also realize that strict induction will not create theory; to generate theory, a creative leap is needed. (shrink)

ABSTRACTRicoeur’s proposal to understand the encounter between religions as a practice of ‘linguistic hospitality’ has appealed to many interreligious scholars. Usually, religious texts are at the heart of interreligious hermeneutics, turning Ricoeur’s linguistic hospitality into a practice of interreligious cross-reading. Recently, due to the influence of material and ritual scholars, the textual focus of interreligious hermeneutics has been criticized. Two criticisms are prominent. First, the assumption that understanding religious otherness is best mediated via language and texts leads religious scholars to (...) minimize the ‘non-textual’ practices in religious life. Second, interreligious interpreters mistakenly assume that they can read all meaningful action and ritual performances, especially as texts. This assumption leads to a textualization of the world and does not take into account that there might be other ‘vehicles of intelligibility’ apart from texts. In this article, I explore to what extent the criticisms raised against Ricoeur’s interreligious hermeneutics are fair. I have learned from Ricoeur the importance of mediating between seemingly opposed positions, and I seek to follow his example in this article. (shrink)

The pluralist hypothesis as popularised by John Hick, which postulates the rough equality of religious traditions, has gained wide approval especially within interreligious circles. Nonetheless, Hick remains one of the most contested philosophers of religion of the twentieth century. Most notably, theologians have been highly critical; their polemical reactions to his pluralist hypothesis reveal their irritation. The question is: from where does this irritation arise? Why are these theologians so offended by a philosopher? How are we to understand the polemics (...) that have arisen in response to Hick’s pluralism? In this article I suggest that the controversy surrounding Hick’s pluralist hypothesis relates to the way he develops his philosophical reflections in a theological direction. There is something wrong with the way he divides the roles between philosophy and theology. I regard the discussion, which emerged from Hicks philosophy of religion as a prototype for a reflection on the complex relation between both disciplines. (shrink)

Background: Studies have demonstrated the extensive use of coercion in Norwegian nursing homes, which represents ethical, professional as well as legal challenges to the staff. We have, however, limited knowledge of the experiences and views of nursing home patients and their relatives. Objectives: The aim of this study is to explore the perspectives of nursing home patients and next of kin on the use of coercion; are there situations where the use of coercion can be defended, and if so, under (...) which circumstances? Methods: The data are based on individual interviews with 35 patients living in six nursing homes and seven focus group interviews with 60 relatives. Ethical considerations: Participation was based on written informed consent, and the study was approved by the Regional Committees for Medical and Health Research Ethics. Results: More than half of the patients and the majority of the relatives accepted the use of coercion, trusting the staff to act in the patient’s best interest. However, the acceptance of coercion is strongly related to the patients’ lack of understanding, to prevent health risks and to preserve the patient’s dignity. Conclusion: The majority of nursing home patients and relatives accepted the use of coercion in specific situations, while at the same time they emphasised the need to try alternative strategies first. There is still a need for good qualitative research on the use of coercion in nursing homes, especially with a closer focus on the perspectives and experiences of nursing home patients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 45, no. 1. © 2019 by Elisabeth Blair 173 How it feels is a series of questions Are you home now, or in the body of a bird? Do you drown, or do you sit calm in the watery air? And the fire—did you light it yourself, or did someone you know, or someone you have yet to meet? Can you sit quiet by it or (...) is it bridging the wet and dry with its feet, consuming your shoes first, then your eyes, skipping the topography in between in fickle pecking like chicken for grain? Is the shower water or is it fire? What if you want to feel something? Are you tired of time, to be so locked into now in this way, in the shower, and later in the circle, where they’ll say, We saw your scars, we know you were abused— it’s OK—we were too— —? But you had only scratched your back in the shower (accidentally) that day. Elisabeth Blair 174 Elisabeth Blair What is the fire that is the fire of drowning and what is the urgency that is the command of fog, saying you’d better sit down? You’d better stand up. Wood. Upholstery. Snow. Mud. These are real, while you are sinister, not believed. There were welts on your back; now they’ve gone. You try to explain: You had a belly once. You had a body. This place stores you in the leg of a bird, and not an invested one but a chicken, pecking, running lines in the ground. Most of the time is gone. You’re a stream down which a foundling comes. You’re a paramecium—all the hints and holds of life are here in you, but you are just a little one. You’re a mouth. You use yourself to laugh, to clutch your chin with one hand, rest the other on your knee. You use yourself to say no, I do not have scars—to clarify. You use yourself like the chicken in the yard uses itself to get by. Elisabeth Blair 175 Listen. I haven’t hit you. I’ve only used your body to demonstrate the richness of your feeling and the piracy inherent in your unwillingness to brave the feeling. I’ve only pulled you up. I’ve only sheltered you with a slap. I’ve dipped into your orange blood with my finger and felt relief—I know how to help. You listen to me— your blood will redden, then your face. You’ll get better. 176 Elisabeth Blair The English boy dwells in any of many neurodivergent states, no doubt undiagnosed. You only speak when spoken to by the staff, but he will and does speak—and laugh. He pulls his pants down and shits in the mess tent. You look at the grain in the rough wooden bench. He kicks as they tackle him to the ground, and all the while—as they swear and shout and he fights—comes that laughter, making ripples on your eyes. They put him in a sleeping bag, wrap a tarp around it, tie it with rope, then leave him on the ground for days, on display, in March, in the mountains, in many feet of snow. They call it a burrito. Let him laugh, they say, let him wiggle and roll.  [we were not killed]  [I am not ungrateful  I am not ungrateful] Elisabeth Blair 177 Age 16 A few years before, your horns newly removed, there had come a drought. Once you felt it, and felt yourself not just alone but marked— once on the forehead and once on either side where you had been but now were not— you developed doubts. You had intended to be reasonable, to talk. But the melting ice: there was no container. The evaporating water: there was no shade. No room to meet in. No family to group. No wits to gather or weave, nothing to save. Your hands became a precipice attached to a belief. The belief was mismanaged, had a bad day. Stuff clattered onto you. You lay there in the stuff and knew you had broken hearts. People... (shrink)

This article explores a particular pattern of wartime violence, the relative absence of sexual violence on the part of many armed groups. This neglected fact has important policy implications: If some groups do not engage in sexual violence, then rape is not inevitable in war as is sometimes claimed, and there are stronger grounds for holding responsible those groups that do engage in sexual violence. After developing a theoretical framework for understanding the observed variation in wartime sexual violence, the article (...) analyzes the puzzling absence of sexual violence on the part of the secessionist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka. (shrink)

This study examines the similarities and differences in pre- and post-Sarbanes-Oxley corporate ethics codes and codes of conduct using the framework of structuration theory. Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation in 2002 in the United States, publicly traded companies there undertook development and revision of their codes of ethics in response to new regulatory requirements as well as incentives under the U.S. Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, which were also revised as part of the SOX mandates. Questions that remain are (...) whether these new or revised codes are effective means of communicating changed ethical foci and attitudes in organizations. Centering resonance analysis (CRA) is used to identify differences and similarities across time and industries by analyzing word networks of 46 pre- and post-SOX corporate codes of ethics. Analyses focus on content and structure of generated word networks as well as resulting factors that emerged from the texts. Results are interpreted from the structuration perspective that content and structure of codes are constrained and enabled by system structures while they function to produce and reproduce those structures. Results indicate that corporate codes of ethics are formal discourses of ethics, laws, and control. Code structure has changed across time, with an increased emphasis on compliance in post-SOX codes. Implications for research and practice are discussed in light of findings. (shrink)

I argue that four of the fundamental claims of those calling themselves `genic pluralists'Philip Kitcher, Kim Sterelny, and Ken Watersare defective. First, they claim that once genic selectionism is recognized, the units of selection problems will be dissolved. Second, Sterelny and Kitcher claim that there are no targets of selection. Third, Sterelny, Kitcher, and Waters claim that they have a concept of genic causation that allows them to give independent genic causal accounts of all selection processes. I argue that each (...) one of these claims is either false or misleading. Moreover, the challenge that arises from the availability of genic causal accounts, namely, the inability to choose on rational grounds among genic and higher-level accounts, is unsupported. (shrink)

Background: Human rights are an important part of nursing practice. Although there is increasing recognition regarding the importance of including human rights education in nursing education, few studies have focused on nursing students’ perspectives and experiences in relation to human rights in nursing, especially regarding older nursing home residents’ right to food. Objective: To explore nursing students’ perspectives and experiences in relation to the right to food. Research design: The study followed a qualitative interpretative research design. Data were collected from (...) multistage focus groups before, during and after clinical placement in a nursing home and analysed through thematic analysis. Participants and research context: Participants were 18 first-year nursing students; the study was conducted in 2017. Ethical considerations: This study was approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Findings: Students’ understanding of older nursing home residents’ right to food was a dynamic process. Their perceptions evolved from a polarized perspective to a reality orientation and finally to retrospective reflection. Discussion: The article discusses how nursing students learn about and understand human rights within and throughout their placements. Conclusion: The study bridges human rights theory and practice. Findings suggest that the human right to food must be enacted in daily practice for students to learn in context. Human rights education, specifically pertaining to nutritional care, thus benefits from a practice-oriented approach preparing students to face ‘real life’ challenges and ethical dilemmas. Findings will help nurse educators tailor education in this field. (shrink)

The paper discusses the role affective factors may play in explaining why, in Capgras'delusion, the delusional belief once formed is maintained and argues that there is an important link between the modularity of the relevant emotional system and the persistence of the delusional belief.

In a recent paper, Gow raised a new and interesting problem for externalist representationalism, the conclusion of which is that its proponents are unable to provide an acceptable account of the phenomenal character of colour hallucination. In contrast to Gow, we do not believe that the problem is particularly severe – indeed, that there is any problem at all. Thus our aim is to defend externalist representationalism against the problem raised by Gow. To this end, we will first reconstruct her (...) reasoning, and then show that it poses no real challenge to externalist representationalism. (shrink)

In this paper, we draw attention to an unintended but severe side effect of just war thinking: the fact that it can impose barriers to making peace. Investigating historical material concerning a series of conflicts in China during the early twentieth century, we suggest that operating in a just war framework might change actors' identities and interests in a way that makes peacemaking an unavailable action. But since just war theory places significant normative constraints on how long wars can be (...) continued, it might thus be self-defeating, in the sense that those who adopt it may undermine the very goals which it is supposed to serve. Whether this finding calls for a revision of existing ethical frameworks governing warfare will depend on whether there are possible alternatives to just war theory that perform better at reining in unjust violence. (shrink)

When the University of Halle-Wittenberg founded the Interdisciplinary Centre for Research into the European Enlightenment in 1993, it was following the destiny of its history as a centre of the Early Enlightenment in Germany which affected the whole of Europe and as one of the moving forces behind the Anthropological Turn. Research foci of the Centre have been and are Enlightenment anthropology, Enlightenment in the reference field of early modem esotericism, university history, philanthropism and the Garden Kingdom of Dessau-W rlitz; (...) more recent emphasis has been on the Early Enlightenment as a field of experimentation and the foundation of cultural models for the Modern Age. The results of this research have been published since Autumn 1995 in the Centres' research publications series entitled University of Halle Series on the European Enlightenment. In addition, there have been relevant works produced outside the Centre. Two to four volumes are published annually (monographs, collected volumes, commentaries on sources). (shrink)

This paper explores the behavior of the banking industry in the new business environment that arose after the subprime crisis. The main hypothesis is that there are two major types of banking institutions: conventional banks and ethical banks. Each has a distinct business model. To test how they have reacted to the new environment, factor analysis techniques have been used. The main findings are twofold. Firstly, the new financial context has indeed caused the behavior of mainstream banks to change. Within (...) this group, one can further distinguish between those that have tried to anticipate the changes by adopting a more responsible financial attitude and those that have merely modified their banking practice to comply with the new regulatory framework. Secondly, there are the so-called ethical banks. Interestingly, their behavior has scarcely been altered by the new financial context. The main conclusion is that the different response of both types of banks reflects the existence of a distinct business model. (shrink)

Hospitals in many countries have had clinical ethics committees for over 20 years. Despite this, there has been little research to evaluate these committees and growing evidence that they are underutilized. To address this gap, we investigated the question ‘What are the barriers and facilitators nurses and physicians perceive in consulting their hospital ethics committee?’ Thirty-four nurses, 10 nurse managers and 31 physicians working at four Canadian hospitals were interviewed using a semi-structured interview guide as part of a larger investigation. (...) We used content analysis of the interview data related to barriers and facilitators to use of hospital ethics committees to identify nine categories of barriers and nine categories of facilitators. These categories as well as their subcategories are discussed and those specific to nurses or physicians are identified. The need to increase health professionals' use of clinical ethics committees through reducing barriers and maximizing facilitators is discussed. (shrink)

Can there be a philosophy of taste? This paper opens by raising some metaphilosophical questions about the study of taste – what it consists of and what method we should adopt in pursuing it. It is suggested that the best starting point for philosophising about taste is against the background of 18th-century epistemology and philosophy of mind, and the conceptual tools this new philosophical paradigm entails. The notion of aesthetic taste in particular, which emerges from a growing sense of dissatisfaction (...) with an undifferentiated category of taste, comes to be set apart from gustatory taste on account of its normativity and aspirations to objectivity. The paradox of taste, as found in Hume and Kant, is examined, and shown to be highly relevant to contemporary metaphysical debate within aesthetics. Specifically, this paper argues that both Realists and Anti-Realists rely more heavily than assumed on the idea of taste. (shrink)

Muslim women often come to mind when we think of women and their lives between the sharp borders of sun and shadow, male/female, private/public, veiled/naked, imprisoned/liberated. However, women exposed to patriarchal patterns within different faith traditions, and within many secular contexts, have some similarities even if no group is monolithic or can be compared with other groups as if there were easy analogies. In recent years there have been strong forces in Europe, and elsewhere, that seem to have as their (...) goal to antagonize groups against each other. Jews are set up against Muslims, Christians against Muslims and vice versa. In such a situation, secularism seems to be the only positive alternative. However, the sharp border between secularism and religious traditions has also been criticized for being simplistic. The notion of intersectionality has created an awareness of the interrelatedness of multiple layers of oppression and the need to be whole as a person. This article warns against falling into simplistic categories such as those used by neo-nationalists as well as of ultraliberal neo-atheists. Secularism, culture and religion, and thus multiculturalism, need be seen in nonessential terms that honour fluidity, process, ambivalence and hybridity. In this article I want to argue that women’s religious agency intersects with education, health, economy and moral autonomy based on an affirmation of multi-layered, fluid identities. (shrink)

Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal ‘parsing’ to sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some very interesting and important ideas about (...) the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not. (shrink)

A central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be (...) that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn’t have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency. (shrink)

In Nietzsche, Tension, and the Tragic Disposition, Matthew Tones undertakes an ambitious journey through Nietzsche’s writings, dealing with, among other things, Nietzsche’s notion of tragedy, his relation to ancient Greek thought, his naturalism, and the concept of nobility developed in GM and BGE. Tones thus gives a detailed and insightful reconstruction of Nietzsche’s philosophy. But this strength of the book is unfortunately also its limit. Tones highlights the complexities of the problems he discusses, but one gets the impression that he (...) succumbs to his “will” to systematize Nietzsche’s thinking: he creates harmonies where there are tensions and gives answers where Nietzsche leaves us with questions.... (shrink)

Il y a une convergence obligée entre SF et féminisme. D'abord la SF a 'pour ancêtre l'utopie, et imagine donc des modèles de société autres, tout comme le féminisme est obligé de le faire; ensuite, la SF permet d'aborder les problèmes des femmes d'un point de vue créatif et non réactif comme la littérature normative; enfin la distance mythique retrouvée dans la SF permet aux auteures et lectrices d'accéder pleinement au registre héroïque, qui leur est souvent dénié par la littérature (...) normative.There is a necessary convergence between science fiction and feminism. On one hand, SF has utopia for an ancestor and therefore invents other societal models, as feminism itself must do. On the other hand, SF deals creatively with women's problems, not just reactively like mainstream literature does. And finally, due to the mythic perspective that permeates SF, writers and readers can fully participate in the heroic, which is often denied to by mainstream literature. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:On Secular Governance: Lutheran Perspectives on Contemporary Legal Issues ed. by Ronald W. Duty and Marie A. FailingerElisabeth Rain KincaidOn Secular Governance: Lutheran Perspectives on Contemporary Legal Issues Edited by Ronald W. Duty and Marie A. Failinger grand rapids, mi: eerdmans, 2016. 382 pp. $45.00In editing this collection of essays, Ronald Duty and Marie Failinger describe their goal as seeking "to bring more Lutheran voices to the pressing (...) legal issues" in local and global contexts (1). They point out that in discussions between the fields of religion and law to date, "Jewish, Muslim, Catholic, and Reformed perspectives have largely dominated" (1). In bringing Lutheran perspectives to questions of law and religion, this collection begins an important task of retrieving a theological perspective on law that was integral for the formation of modern legal thought but has been largely absent from contemporary discussions of law and religion.The strength of this collection of essays lies in the breadth of contemporary legal questions addressed and in the diversity of perspectives offered. Since, as Duty and Failinger point out, recent Lutheran scholarship has been relatively silent on questions of law and religion, there is a broad field of issues to explore. This collection avoids too narrowly focusing on any one "hot-button" issue of law and religion, such as questions of religious liberty or relationship between church and state, although these questions are addressed. Rather, it benefits from a truly expansive view of contemporary legal issues and includes essays on issues as diverse as immigration reform, family law, fiduciary duties, military chaplaincy, and water rights in the American Southwest. The collection also shows geographical breadth, and looks beyond the contemporary American and European legal arena to consider how theology could affect law in Nigeria and Rwanda. The volume also benefits from a wide range of theoretical approaches, including contributions from both legal scholars and theologians. In [End Page 211] the dialectic that results as theologians consider law and legal scholars consider theology, we see a performative example of the Lutheran concept of two kingdoms, both coexisting under God's domain.The collection would have benefited from a broader use of theological sources to accompany this admirably broad approach to legal issues. Many, although not all, of the essays, draw only on Martin Luther's understanding of Christian engagement with legal authority. This focus on Luther's somewhat limited legal corpus can result in a slightly repetitive theological approach among the essays. However, this narrow focus on Luther indicates a potential next stage for further development of Lutheran engagement with contemporary legal issues. In the closing essay in the book, "How Should Modern Lutherans Try to Shape Secular Law?," Robert Benne references John Witte's work in tracing how Philipp Melanchthon and the Lutheran jurists developed Luther's original theory of law to "build bridges between the two kingdoms" (332). While this book provides a good starting point for bringing Lutheran perspectives to bear on contemporary legal issues, it also indicates the need for future research to excavate the perspectives of Melanchthon and jurists such as Johannes Eisermann and Johann Oldendorp, along with more modern Lutheran scholars of law and religion, such as Helmut Thielicke, who considered the legacy of Lutheran legal theory in the wake of post-Nazi Germany. Both Lutheran theological approaches to law and legal approaches to religion will undoubtedly be enriched if the editors' project continues, resulting in continued excavation of later Lutheran interpretation and reception of theories of law, which will bring Lutheran theology ever closer to the challenges of contemporary legal issues in the modern nation-state.Elisabeth Rain KincaidUniversity of Notre DameCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

This paper concerns the credibility problem for commitments. Commitments play an important role in cooperative human interactions and can dramatically improve the performance of joint actions by stabilizing expectations, reducing the uncertainty of the interaction, providing reasons to cooperate or improving action coordination. However, commitments can only serve these functions if they are credible in the first place. What is it then that insures the credibility of commitments? To answer this question, we need to provide an account of what motivates (...) us to abide by our commitments. We first discuss two conceptions of the nature of the commitments present in joint action and of the norms that govern them. We contend that while normative considerations may have some motivational force, there are reasons to doubt that they, by themselves, could provide a sufficient motivational basis to fully explain why agents abide by their commitments and thus why their commitments are credible. In the next two sections, we discuss two proposals regarding further sources of motivation, reputation management and social emotions. We argue that while reputation management and social emotions certainly play a role in motivating us to act as committed, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to think that neither captures the most basic motivational force at work in sustaining commitments. We propose instead that the need to belong, i.e., the need to affiliate with others and form long-lasting bonds with them, is what primarily motivates us to interact and engage with those around us and act so as to preserve and reinforce the bonds we have forged with them. We argue that the need to belong is a more basic proximate motivation for conforming to commitments, in the sense both that affiliative behaviors are evidenced much earlier in human development than either reputation management or social emotions and that the need to belong is at least part of an explanation of why we care for our reputation and why we care about others’ assessments of our behavior. (shrink)